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the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes.

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes.

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority.

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social

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177 dating, employment of men and women in offices and stores — all these
562 factors tend to break down the wall between the sexes. The Muslim youth today is not only increasingly able to plan its future without regard to the wishes of parents, but also has many opportunities to mingle freely with members of the opposite sex. All this helps undermine the traditional habits
517 in marriage selection. Among the urban Muslim intelligentsia it appears
583 now to be the rule for the young couples to decide upon marriage first and to ask parents for permission afterwards, as is done in Western societies. In the villages, where the hold of tradition is stronger and the family more closely knit, the parents still do play an important, and perhaps even decisive, role in the arrangement of marriages; but here, too, the tendency seems to run against tradition.

583 An influential factor in the marriage arrangement among Central Asian
177 Muslims was the *kalym*, or bride price. The *kalym* was paid to the parents of the bride by the parents of the bridegroom prior to the wedding. In the steppe regions, it consisted usually of livestock, averaging in pre-Revolutionary days from 50 to 100 horses and an equal or larger number of sheep — a sizeable fortune by local standards. In Turkestan, the *kalym* consisted of gifts of money, jewels, or other valuables. The payment of the *kalym* is one of the few traditions of a nonreligious nature outlawed by the Soviet regime, ostensibly as "degrading" to women, but its illegality explains only in part its actual decline, which is probably due more to the impoverishment of the native population over the past 25 years. What Kazakh disposes of 50 horses or sheep? Poverty seems to have reduced the tradition of the *kalym* to a purely symbolic significance. It apparently continues to survive in one form or another throughout Central Asia, but it no longer performs any important economic function.

836 One of the more startling results of information gathered from refugees
177 is the impression of strict sexual morality prevailing among Soviet Muslims. Despite the freer mingling of sexes, there is little opportunity for sexual promiscuity because of the close watch exercised over the girls by their families and the great value attached by the natives to virginity. Most of the refugees agreed that an unmarried Muslim girl who has lost her virginity — no matter under what circumstances — is considered to be on the same level as a common prostitute. Her chances of marriage are almost nonexistent, because it is generally accepted that a marriage contract is void if the bride is found on the wedding night not to be a virgin. On the whole, sexual licentiousness seems rare: it is prevented by tradition and by the control exercised by the family, to whom a deflowered daughter not only brings public disgrace but also represents a lasting financial liability.[4]

[4] Newspapers and periodicals from Central Asia indicate that, despite Soviet efforts aimed at changing native attitudes toward women, tradition persists. It seems apparently to be quite common practice for natives to withdraw daughters from school when the girls attain the

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads.
463 Their occupations are agriculture, gardening and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/
764 After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
765 and buried directly in the ground. After the burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the
593 lapse of ninety days. In family life parental authority is very strong and the father is the
291 absolute head of the family. The women do not cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[1] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (13;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons (4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti(3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]